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CLINICAL MANAGERS’ IDENTITY AT THE 
CROSSROAD OF MULTIPLE INSTITUTIONAL 
LOGICS IN IT INNOVATION: THE CASE STUDY OF A 
HEALTHCARE ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND  
 
Abstract 
Clinical managers play a crucial role in securing the implementation and 
sustainability of IT innovation in healthcare. Yet, not all clinical managers are 
willing and able to support IT innovation, particularly when the institutional 
logics of an IT innovation challenge their professional practice. We investigate 
how clinical managers use their hybrid identities to reconcile differences 
among competing institutional logics that affect IT innovation. Based on three 
examples of IT innovation (telehealth for Obstructive Sleep Apnoea, telehealth 
for Heart Failure, and Electrocardiograms) in a healthcare organisation in 
England, we identify three roles in IT innovation (innovation advocate, 
innovation broker, innovation laggard) that clinical managers enacted in 
response to three degrees of conflict between institutional logics (no conflict, 
moderate conflict, and high conflict), respectively. We make the following 
contributions. First, we demonstrate how clinical managers’ perception of their 
hybrid role in relation to their professional identity influences their response to 
the conflicting institutional demands of IT innovation. We conclude that clinical 
managers’ fragmented identities can compromise their ability to effectively 
manage IT innovation in healthcare. Second, our findings raise implications 
for understanding the role of professionals’ hybrid identities in the 
implementation of digital transformation at the intersection of multiple 
institutional logics.  
Keywords: IT innovation, healthcare, institutional logics, professional 
identities, telehealth 
 
MANAGING IT INNOVATION ACROSS MULTIPLE INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS 
Information Technology (IT) innovations are, for the most part, complex 
initiatives that involve various stakeholder organisations and professions. 
These different stakeholders hold divergent expectations of what an IT 
innovation should do and how it should be deployed, often, retarding its 
adoption and implementation (Bunduchi et al., 2015; Sandeep & Ravishankar, 
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2014). Multiple interpretations of an IT innovation resonate different 
institutional logics (Boonstra et al., 2017), namely, the cultural resources and 
norms that shape the way individuals perceive their social reality and, 
therefore, guide their behaviours and decisions (Friedland & Alford, 1991).  
Compared to other industries, the tension among multiple logics and 
their effect on IT innovation is even more sharply defined in healthcare (Currie 
& Guah, 2007; Doolin, 2004). In the past three decades, various Western 
countries have adopted New Public Management (NPM) reforms (Lynn, 2006) 
that prioritize IT innovation to promote the logic of managerialism, that is, a 
set of principles and practices that value cost-efficiencies, performance, and 
accountability (Reay & Hinings, 2009). The managerialism of these reforms 
clashes with the logic of medical professionalism, which safeguards the 
autonomy of clinical practice in the provision of patient care (Reay & Hinings, 
2005, 2009). More recently, healthcare policies and IT innovations that 
promote health self-management and home-based monitoring have 
contributed to the diffusion of the logic of patient-centred care (PCC). This 
logic promotes a care model that empowers patients to make informed 
decisions giving them more control over their own health (Shaw et al., 2017). 
It thus challenges medical professionalism by diminishing the authority of 
medical practitioners over patients’ decisions. Hence, medical professionals 
who occupy managerial positions and are often in charge of IT innovation are 
challenged with the task of integrating new technologies into day-to-day work 
while safeguarding the integrity of medical practice. 
In this paper we explore how hybrid managerial professionals, such as 
clinical managers, deploy their multiple identities and social position to 
facilitate IT innovation while having to manage competing logics such as 
medical professionalism, managerialism, and PCC. We define clinical 
managers as doctors who, compared to other healthcare professionals such 
as nurses, usually occupy a high managerial position in the hierarchy of an 
organisation (e.g. clinical directors). They thus have authority and resources 
to mobilize organisational and professional stakeholders and influence 
change (Exworthy & Halford, 1999). In addition, clinical managers are 
“hybrids”, i.e. they share both clinical and managerial responsibilities 
(Fitzgerald et al., 2013; McGivern et al., 2015). As such, they are in a 
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privileged position to facilitate IT innovation by spanning the boundaries 
among managerial and professional communities (Baeza et al., 2008; 
Fitzgerald et al., 2013), their respective logics (McDonald et al., 2013), and 
PCC.  
Yet, not all clinical managers are willing to leverage their social position 
to act more independently from professional control and reconcile differences 
among multiple institutional logics (Causer & Exworthy, 1999; Ferlie & 
Pettigrew, 1996; McGivern et al., 2015). Their task becomes even more 
challenging when IT innovations are carriers of an emerging logic like PCC. 
Not only does this logic compete for attention with managerialism and medical 
professionalism, but it can also create conflict with their professional practice 
without sharing elements with their hybrid identities. Hence, our objective is to 
investigate clinical managers’ role of mediating between competing logics 
when they are faced with the responsibility of facilitating IT innovation. We will 
therefore address the following research question: how do clinical managers 
reconcile differences among competing institutional logics that affect IT 
innovation in healthcare? 
Our study makes the following contributions to debates about IT 
innovation and professions. First, even though existing research has 
recognised the role of medical professionals in influencing IT innovation 
(Davidson & Chismar, 2007; Oborn et al., 2011; Rivard et al., 2011), less 
attention has been paid to the implications of clinical managers and their 
hybrid identities for the success of IT innovation. Knowing how clinical 
managers are willing and able to support IT innovation is important given that, 
in the majority of cases, IT innovations in healthcare hardly go beyond the 
pilot phase (Andreassen et al., 2015; Barlow et al., 2006), and the leadership 
of influential actors like clinical managers can contribute to their sustainability 
(Martin et al., 2012).  
Second, we further our understanding of the role of professionals in 
managing competing logics that affect IT innovation. As shown in recent 
research, different occupational groups influence IT implementations by 
loosely coupling their practices to multiple logics, i.e. they accept elements of 
a new logic without changing their day-to-day practices (Berente & Yoo, 2012; 
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Boonstra et al., 2017). We demonstrate how actors shift across multiple logics 
and, thereby, affect IT innovation by managing their hybrid identities.       
Our analysis draws on existing research on institutional logics and the 
re-stratification thesis (Freidson, 1994) to understand clinical managers’ role 
in reconciling differences among competing logics that influence IT innovation. 
We use the empirical case of three examples of IT innovation, digitally-
enabled Electrocardiograms (ECGs) and two telehealth projects, to illustrate, 
explain, and amplify theoretical perspectives. Our case study focuses on the 
role of clinical managers of a healthcare organisation in England in making 
recommendations for the use of ECGs by primary care doctors and the 
development of two telehealth projects, one for patients with Obstructive 
Sleep Apnoea (OSA) and the other for patients with Heart Failure (HF). Both 
OSA and HF are chronic conditions that burden most healthcare systems 
globally. The fact that some primary care doctors in England hold a position 
as clinical managers gives us the opportunity to understand how the 
relationships with their profession may influence their will and ability to 
manage conflicting institutional demands for the sake of IT innovation. In 
addition, the comparison between a more traditional type of IT innovation like 
ECGs and more advanced IT-enabled services like telehealth gives insight 
into the different institutional consequences of different types of IT 
innovations. 
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND IT INNOVATION 
Institutional logics constitute the norms and beliefs that regulate the behaviour 
of individuals and the selection of technologies (Lounsbury, 2002; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999). Due to their normative power, logics can constrain human 
action and be a source of resistance to change (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007) 
and IT innovation (Sandeep & Ravishankar, 2014). Nevertheless, new 
practices and technologies carry with them new institutional logics (Rajao & 
Hayes, 2009), which, in turn, challenge the dominant logic of an 
organisational field. An organisational field is an aggregate of organisations 
(e.g. suppliers, customers, regulatory bodies) that provide similar services and 
products (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In healthcare, an organisational field is 
formed by those organisations that contribute to the provision of health 
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services to a population, such as hospitals, health regulatory authorities, and 
medical professional bodies. New logics that challenge the dominant logic of 
an organisational field can become a source of new meanings and practices 
that actors may enact to bring about change (Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999). 
With a few exceptions (Mola & Carugati, 2012), most research in 
Information Systems (IS) shows how tension between logics persists across 
time (e.g. Hayes & Rajao, 2011), which plunges IT-enabled transformations in 
a precarious equilibrium that is continually contested and renegotiated. For 
example, as an attempt to compromise between conflicting logics, a new 
technology can be readapted to conform to the practices and norms of the 
implementation context (Carugati et al., 2018; Davidson & Chismar, 2007). 
Few studies have analysed the implications of compromising between 
multiple logics when different occupational roles or professions are involved. 
Loose coupling is an example of how users can deal with compromise and 
ambiguity between multiple logics. For example, by separating automated 
monitoring from actual performance of activities, users adapt to 
managerialism without changing their core professional practices (Berente & 
Yoo, 2012). Users remain loyal to the logic of their profession and are more 
likely to loosely couple their practices to a new logic when they have worked 
in different occupational roles (Boonstra et al., 2017). This is the case of 
professionals taking on a managerial role. As shown in other studies, hybrid 
identities influence the extent to which managerial professionals are willing to 
compromise between logics (McGivern et al., 2015). By drawing on the 
example of clinical managers in charge of IT innovation, we adopt the concept 
of hybrid identities to understand better how actors navigate multiple 
institutional logics in making IT-related decisions.  
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND IT INNOVATION IN HEALTHCARE 
In the health sector, various studies have documented the existence of two 
main logics: the logics of medical professionalism and managerialism (Currie 
& Guah, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2005; van den Broek et al., 2014). Under a 
logic of medical professionalism, medical professionals such as primary and 
secondary care doctors prioritise their relationship with the patient and value 
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their autonomy in controlling the provision and quality of the health service 
(Kitchener & Exworthy, 2008). By contrast, the logic of managerialism reflects 
health sector reforms to improve the efficiency and performance of the health 
service (Kitchener, 2002). This logic influences the running of day-to-day 
operations in hospitals. This is evidenced by an increasing number of medical 
professionals taking on managerial roles as well as paying attention to costs 
and resources in the performance of routine tasks (Carvalho, 2012). In 
addition, the logic of managerialism has driven the introduction of market and 
competition, which, in England, translates into the commissioning of health 
services (Allen et al., 2017). The commissioning function that some medical 
professionals are required to assume is thus part of the logic of 
managerialism (Martin et al., 2017). 
A third and less documented logic is patient-centred care (PCC). PCC is 
an emergent logic that is not fully established and has elements of overlap 
with other logics. PCC has its roots in consumerism (fostered by 
managerialism) (Latimer et al., 2017), the rise of expert patients (enabled by 
the internet) (Petrakaki et al., 2018), and the reaction against professional 
paternalism (Kitson et al., 2013). To date, very few studies have analysed 
PCC as an institutional logic (Shaw et al., 2017). After realising the pitfalls of 
acute care in the management of complex and long-term chronic conditions, 
policy-makers in various countries have promoted the diffusion of this logic 
through policies that drive the transition from hospital care to home-based 
care for improved patient satisfaction and cost-efficiencies (Klecun, 2015). 
Whereas medical professionalism only recognizes the authority of clinicians in 
the provision of patient care, PCC requires healthcare organisations and 
professionals to re-orient their thinking and processes and encourages 
patients to participate actively in their care (Kitson et al., 2013; Shaw et al., 
2017). In addition, the saving logic of managerialism does not always agree 
with the PCC logic of putting patients first. Table 1 compares the three logics 
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Research has shown that IT innovations can reproduce tensions among 
competing logics. For example, clinical management information systems 
often respond to the managerialist logic of performance and efficiency in 
healthcare resource management and clinical practice (Currie & Guah, 2007; 
Doolin, 2004). The introduction of these systems creates tension with medical 
professionalism by disrupting established patterns of work (Boonstra & Van 
Offenbeek, 2010; Nicolini, 2006; Petrakaki et al., 2012) and challenging the 
professional autonomy of clinicians (Abraham & Junglas, 2011; Davidson & 
Chismar, 2007; Doolin, 2004; Exworthy, 2015; Exworthy et al., 2003). To date, 
very few studies have focused on IT innovations that promote PCC as well as 
managerialism. Telehealth home monitoring solutions are a clear example of 
such innovations (Klecun, 2015).  
Telehealth is the IT-enabled provision of medical services without in-
person interactions between physicians and patients (Bashshur & Lovett, 
1977). Telehealth can enable different types of remote encounters, including 
telecommunications links between healthcare facilities for the remote 
provision of specialist medical interventions (such as in telesurgery) and 
patient-physician teleconsultations (such as in teledermatology) (Di Cerbo et 
al., 2015). Our use of the term telehealth in this paper refers specifically to 
another type of intervention called remote patient monitoring, namely, the 
provision of care directly in the home of patients through the use of IT-enabled 
monitoring systems (Barlow et al., 2006). Whilst doctors are responsible for 
the care of patients, telehealth can delegate patients’ monitoring to nurses or 
even to the patients themselves. The system can flag either a doctor or a 
nurse of the need for medical intervention. Telehealth is therefore a complex 
IT innovation that involves various stakeholders across professional and 
organisational boundaries. It might clash with existing norms, values and 
views of how care should be provided and reconfigure the power positions 
among stakeholders (Boonstra & Van Offenbeek, 2010).  
Telehealth can thus be the carrier of multiple logics. For example, 
through remote monitoring of patients, telehealth works as a preventative 
measure to avoid admissions and is therefore a carrier of the managerialist 
logic of reducing costs. At the same time, telehealth can enable a fast and 
accurate response to patients’ needs. It thus improves the quality of care and 
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responds to the logic of PCC (Klecun-Dabrowska & Cornford, 2000; 
McDonald, 2017).  
We conclude that the success of IT innovation in healthcare depends on 
how stakeholders shape and are shaped by the tensions among competing 
logics and the misalignment of interests and values that such logics entail 
(Bunduchi et al., 2015). Influential actors are often considered in a strong 
position to mediate differences among stakeholder groups (Boonstra et al., 
2008; Cho & Mathiassen, 2007) and shift opinion in favour or against IT 
innovation (Kaganer et al., 2010; Pouloudi et al., 2016). The focus of this 
study is on the role of clinical managers in seeking to gain support for IT 
innovation among medical professionals. 
CLINICAL MANAGERS’ IDENTITY AND IT INNOVATION 
Medical professionals filling clinical managerial posts continue practising their 
profession to maintain professional credibility, while they have the 
responsibility to promote efficiency and accountability within their professional 
practice and the healthcare establishment that they manage (Causer & 
Exworthy, 1999). These positions are often thought to enhance the 
performance of the organisation (Goodall, 2011). In England, some primary 
care doctors have a unique position in commissioning local health services 
and constitute a clear example of clinical managers that could be strongly 
influenced by their clinical colleagues (Kitchener & Exworthy, 2008; 
Zachariadis et al., 2013, p. 11). How clinical managers continuously negotiate 
their new managerial role in relation to their medical professional identity has 
implications for how they facilitate and manage IT innovation. If they perceive 
their hybrid role as violating their core professional identity, clinical managers 
are less likely to construct a hybrid identity (Spyridonidis et al., 2015). 
Likewise, clinical managers may not enforce the use of IT to control clinical 
practice if they see it as a violation of their professional autonomy and identity 
(Numerato et al., 2012).  
In this paper, we draw on Freidson’s (1994) re-stratification thesis to 
understand clinical managers’ ability to influence IT innovation not just in 
relation to their organisational power but also with regard to their clinical 
authority over fellow clinicians. In his re-stratification thesis, Freidson 
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challenged the idea of de-professionalisation due to bureaucratic and market-
driven changes within organisations. He argued that professions could 
readapt to such changes as well as maintain professional power and 
autonomy. In particular, he posited that professions could reorganise 
themselves and operate across three main strata in order to maintain their 
autonomy from managerialism: the knowledge elite, the administrative elite, 
and rank and file (Waring, 2014). The “knowledge elite” represents research 
or professional bodies that create, codify, and disseminate knowledge in the 
form of standards and guidelines that govern professional practice. The 
“administrative elite” are professional-managerial hybrids, such as clinical 
managers, who enforce standards of good professional practice on rank-and-
file practitioners (e.g. clinicians) (Waring, 2014). Clinical managers that are 
willing to transform medical practice through managerialism exercise their 
autonomy and power over their clinical colleagues (“rank and file”) within the 
limits of what is considered legitimate according to their professional 
standards and, therefore, appropriate for the “knowledge elite” (Ferlie & 
Pettigrew, 1996; McGivern et al., 2015; Scott, 2008). 
Recent academic work has revisited this idea of the hierarchical 
organisation between administrative elites and rank and file within the re-
stratification thesis. Such work argues that the role of administrative elites in 
promoting change in professional practice may not necessarily undermine 
professional collegiality, i.e. members’ cohesion around the values, customs 
and norms of their profession (Waring 2014). For example, in a study about 
primary care in England, McDonald et al. (2009) show that rank-and-file 
doctors are willing to cooperate with the administrative elite in the realisation 
of change that they perceive as important for the reputation and integrity of 
their profession or as a way to protect their routine practice from further 
managerial intrusion. Thus, clinical managers that are united with rank and file 
by a high sense of professional collegiality can be protectors of their 
profession rather than channels for managerialism and, at the same time, act 
as reformers by readapting the managerial logic in a professional guise. 
Therefore, the re-stratification thesis is useful to understand to what extent 
clinical managers (or administrative elite) exercise their power and authority 




Case study background 
This study was part of a research project, which had the objective to 
investigate how medical professionals who occupy leadership positions in 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) conceive their new commissioning 
role in relation to IT innovation. This objective was met by means of a 
qualitative case-study approach involving interviews and observations. CCGs 
were introduced in 2013 as a result of the Health Social Care Act (2012) and 
are responsible for the planning and commissioning of local health services. 
Their responsibilities include deciding priorities and strategies and buying 
services on behalf of the population from providers such as hospitals and 
community clinics. CCGs are member organisations, in which all local primary 
care doctors have a (notional) say in its governance (Checkland et al., 2016). 
The Chair and the majority of CCG board members are also primary care 
doctors, who are required to take on new managerial responsibilities in the 
design and delivery of healthcare services.  
After several contacts with various CCGs, one CCG in England agreed 
to take part to the research. Our focus in the case study was on the role of 
clinical managers in developing a vision for the adoption of IT innovation 
(Swanson & Ramiller, 1997). In particular, we focused on the pre-
implementation phase of two telehealth projects, involving the gathering and 
evaluation of information for the projects approval, from June 2014 until 
January 2015. One telehealth project targeted the development of a new 
service for the diagnosis and treatment of Obstructive Sleep Apnoea (OSA). 
The other telehealth project was aimed at the monitoring and treatment of 
Heart Failure (HF) patients. This project was part of a wider initiative for the 
re-design of the local cardiology service, which, in addition to telehealth, 
promoted the use of ECGs in primary care. The first author became aware of 
recommendations for the adoption of ECGs only during data collection. The 
data analysis revealed the significance of comparing the adoption of a more 
traditional IT innovation like ECGs, most of which are equipped with analog-
to-digital converters to transform ECG readings into digital data, with 
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telehealth for understanding how clinical managers can manage competing 
institutional demands that arise from different types of IT innovations. 
Funding for both OSA and the re-design of the cardiology service was 
available in state budget to support local authorities in the integration of health 
and social care in the community. The CCG approved recommendations for 
adopting ECGs in primary care and the telehealth project for OSA. It did not 
approve the telehealth project for HF.  
Data collection 
The first author conducted sixteen in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
eighteen participants between July 2014 and January 2015. We selected 
sixteen participants from a list provided by the Project Manager and including 
all the key players involved in the OSA telehealth project and the re-design of 
the cardiology service. Only three people in the list refused to be interviewed. 
Table 2 lists participants whose data is reported in this study. 
Participant’s 
Pseudonym 
Organisational Role Professional 
Designation 
Organisation 
Phil Clinical Commissioner 
and Chair of the CCG 
Primary Care Doctor CCG 
Jocelyn Clinical Commissioner Primary Care Doctor CCG 
Jack Clinical Commissioner Primary Care Doctor CCG 
Peter Clinical Lead for 
Cardiology 
Primary Care Doctor CCG 
Stewart Clinical Lead for 
Integrated Care 
Primary Care Doctor CCG 
Claire Clinical Lead for Public 
Health 
Primary Care Doctor Local Authority 
Sue Public Health Lead  Public Health 
Practitioner 
Local Authority 
Ed Project Manager Social Care Worker Local Authority 
Frank  Ear, Nose and Throat 
(ENT) Consultant 
Physician OSA Service 
Provider 
John Ear, Nose and Throat 
(ENT) Consultant 
Physician OSA Service 
Provider 
Janet Account Director Business Consultant Telehealth 
Provider for HF 
Table 2. List of participants that feature in this study 
Other participants, whose data does not feature in this study, include: 
three senior managers working for the Healthcare Community Provider 
designated to deliver the two telehealth services, the telecare manager of the 
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local authority, a secondary care doctor (consultant) with experience in 
telehealth for HF. Finally, the first author conducted an interview with a 
specialist nurse and a care manager, who were not directly involved in these 
projects, but had experience with telehealth for long-term conditions. Each 
interview lasted about one hour.  
Interviews focused on participants’ interpretation of the two telehealth 
projects and the adoption of ECGs in primary care, including initial 
motivations, changes in attitudes and expectations, main challenges 
encountered, quality of relationships. In particular, our aim in the interviews 
was to understand how primary care doctors defined their identities and 
whether they experienced any changes in relation to their new managerial 
role. Institutional logics did not inform the development of our data instrument 
since their relevance became obvious only in the data analysis. 
The first author also conducted the observation of two meetings, one 
about the contractual arrangements for the delivery of telehealth and the other 
about the organisational requirements of the healthcare organisation 
designated to host the OSA service. Each meeting lasted thirty and eighty 
minutes, respectively. Whilst attending these meetings, the first author gained 
useful information about contractual and organisational arrangements and 
views among the different parties that were going to be involved in the 
delivery of telehealth. Both interviews and meetings were audio-recorded, 
when permission was given, and transcribed. In addition, information was 
collected at six public CCG board meetings, each lasting two hours. 
Information from these meetings was useful in setting the IT innovation 
context and in defining the main institutional logics at play and the 
relationships of clinical commissioners with members of their medical 
profession. Aware of the limits of confidentiality, the first author collected 
information from informal conversations with participants to gain a fresh 
insight into the main events and circumstances affecting IT innovation. 
Information about the two telehealth projects and plans to adopt ECGs in 
primary care, including the main institutional logics driving these initiatives, 
was also collected from official documents such as business cases. In her 
field notes, the first author paid particular attention to differences and 
similarities across data. Such comparison across data was useful in 
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corroborating and complementing data across different sources (e.g. 
interviews, documents, observations). Table 6 in the Appendix gives 
examples of how the integration of data sources strengthened conclusions 
about the main themes that emerged from the data analysis.  
Data analysis 
We based the coding and analysis of data on the key ideas of an inductive 
methodology since our aim was to develop theoretical concepts that were 
strongly grounded in the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Sarker et al., 2000; 
Urquhart et al., 2010). Through “open coding” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), we 
identified first-order codes (Gioia et al., 2012) and, in particular, common 
instances of norms, values, and practices related to the adoption of telehealth 
and ECGs as well as actions and meanings that could be attributed to clinical 
managers’ identities (an example of first-order codes is in Table 5 in the 
Appendix). 
We then conducted a second-order analysis through “axial coding” in 
order to organise our codes under a more comprehensive scheme of 
recurring themes or categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) and answer the 
question ‘‘What’s going on here?’’ theoretically (Gioia et al., 2012). At this 
stage of analysis, we noticed the tension between competing institutional 
logics (e.g. tension between PCC logic and medical professionalism). In line 
with an inductive data analysis, we remained loyal to the data, and through 
our “theoretical sensitivity” (Sarker et al., 2000), we drew upon existing 
literature about institutional logics and identities to illuminate our interpretation 
of the data and identify novel concepts that do not find sufficient explanation 
in current literature (Gioia et al., 2012). For example, we used the 
classification of logics summarised in Table 1 to describe the institutional 
logics found in the data. We also drew on the literature on identities to identify 
themes about clinical managers’ self-identifications (Alvesson & Willmott, 
2002; Lok, 2010), and their role claim and use (Creed et al., 2010; Leung et 
al., 2014) in relation to conflicting logics (McGivern et al., 2015). More 
specifically, self-narrations (Brown, 2015; Kyratsis et al., 2017), such as 
explicit and implicit accounts of self-identifications (Lok, 2010), helped us 
understand how clinical managers identified themselves in relation to their 
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hybrid role. We also looked for instances of role claim (Creed et al., 2010), 
which indicate how clinical managers perceived themselves in relation to their 
hybrid role, their medical profession, and the conflicting institutional demands 
of IT innovation. We then identified common patterns of role use (Creed et al., 
2010), which indicate how clinical managers used their hybrid role in 
managing conflicting institutional logics and IT innovation.  
The third and final stage of our analysis involved aggregating second-
order themes into overarching categories (Gioia et al., 2012), such as the role 
of hybrids (clinical managers) in relation to IT innovation and medical 
professionalism and the existence (or absence) of conflict between 
institutional logics. These aggregate themes represent the core of the 
theoretical dimensions and relationships that we developed from our data. 
Figure 2 in the Appendix illustrates our coding scheme, which we used to 
construct narratives about clinical managers’ self-identification and use of 
their hybrid role in relation to the two telehealth projects and the use of ECGs 
in primary care. In the following sections, we illustrate these narratives and 
discuss the key themes and representations that emerged from the 
interpretation of these narrations.  
THE ROLE OF CLINICAL MANAGERS IN IT INNOVATION: A CASE STUDY  
Below we present the narratives of the participants in Table 2. We gave 
participants fictitious names so that it is easy to identify them. First, we 
provide a brief overview of the CCG’s approval process that led to 
recommendations for the use of ECGs in primary care, the adoption of 
telehealth for OSA, and refusal to approve telehealth for HF. Next, we 
illustrate participants’ narratives about the two telehealth projects and ECGs 
in primary care. In these narratives, we identified the institutional logics that 
characterised discussions about these three types of IT innovation and the 
hybrids’ roles in managing these logics. Hybrids were primary care doctors 
that occupied clinical managerial positions and included both clinical leads 
and clinical commissioners. Clinical commissioners and clinical leads 
represented the administrative elite, in charge of reforming and innovating 
medical practice, with clinical leads acting as intermediaries between clinical 
commissioners and primary care doctors (i.e. the rank and file). 
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Overview of the CCG’s approval process of an IT innovation 
Any projects or proposals to introduce a new health service had to pass two 
tests before the CCG could finally approve them. The first test was to have 
the project approved by a working group. Working groups’ membership 
included primary care doctors and other specialists with expertise in the area 
of intervention. For example, the working group in charge of the re-design of 
the cardiology service included one Clinical Commissioner, the Clinical Lead 
for Cardiology (Peter), a Pharmacist, the Public Health Lead (Sue), and the 
Project Manager (Ed). This working group recommended the use of ECGs in 
primary care due to potential savings from shifting basic cardiac diagnostic 
tests from hospitals to primary care. It also evaluated the business case of the 
HF telehealth project. The working group in charge of evaluating the 
telehealth project for OSA had the Clinical Lead for Public Health (Claire) in 
addition to a Clinical Commissioner and the Project Manager among its 
members. These groups relied on the advice of clinical leads, which was 
therefore crucial for the initial approval of the project. After approval from the 
working group, the Clinical Advisory Board of the CCG had to review the 
recommendations of the working group and decide whether the project could 
go ahead. The Clinical Advisory Board included senior clinical managers such 
as Clinical Commissioners (including Phil, Jocelyn, and Jack) and senior non-
clinical managers such as the Chief Finance Officer and the Chief Executive 
Officer.  
The telehealth project for OSA passed the screening of both the working 
group and the Clinical Advisory Board and was therefore approved and 
subsequently implemented in September 2015. The Board recognised the 
potential benefits of telehealth in terms of improved diagnosis of OSA, 
reduced hospital admissions, and better patient experience. By contrast, the 
working group decided not to recommend the telehealth project for HF to the 
Clinical Advisory Board due to concerns that it could increase the workload of 
primary care doctors and put patients at risk. Table 3 summarises the 
operational details, potential benefits and risks of the three IT innovations.  
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Table 3. Operational details, benefits, and risks of IT innovations 
* Operational details are based on information in the business cases of the two telehealth 
projects, the literature on ECGs, and conversations with participants. 
Type of IT 
innovation 





• Patients are given a 
recording equipment for 
home diagnosis. 
• Patients return equipment 
and data are downloaded 
at the clinic to confirm 
OSA diagnosis. 
• Patients are issued with 
Continuous Positive 
Airways Pressure (CPAP) 
equipment for home 
treatment. 
• Clinic conducts weekly 
and monthly monitoring. 
• CPAP treatment is 
terminated when 
evaluated successfully. 
• It improves OSA 
diagnosis rate. 
• It brings care 




• It reduces care 
costs by moving 
diagnosis and 
care out of 
hospital into the 
community. 





• Primary care 
doctors might 
not refer 
patients to the 
OSA clinic. 
• Patients might 
not know about 
the new service 
and choose to 
go to the 
hospital instead.  
Heart 
Failure (HF) 
• Referrals for HF 
telemonitoring come via 
patient registers in 
primary care. 
• Patients that are suitable 
for remote monitoring are 
given equipment to 
monitor HF at home. 
• Telecare team monitor 
and triage data 24/7, 
responds to false alarms 
and fault equipment 
issues, and transfer 
amber and red alerts to 
clinical nurse. 
• Clinical nurse responds to 
alerts (e.g. calls/visits 
patients, refers to GP or 
specialist).  
• It reduces hospital 
admissions and 
saves money. 
• It helps recovery 
by keeping 
patients at home. 
• It empowers 
patients to 
manage their own 
health.  
• The lack of a 
specialist nurse 
to respond to 
patients’ calls 
can put patient 





• A specialist 
nurse can be 
costly.   
• It is harder to 
define patients’ 
cohort to refer 
to the service 
(e.g. low/high 
risk patients). 
ECG • ECG detects the 
electrical signals 
associated with cardiac 
activity and produces a 
graphic record of voltage 
versus time.  
• A resting ECG commonly 
consists of the ECG units, 
electrodes, and cables. 
• Most ECGs have an 
analog-to-digital 
conversion hardware to 
convert ECG readings 
into digital data. 






• It allows primary 




• It helps early 
diagnosis of atrial 
fibrillation, one of 
the leading risk 
factors of stroke. 
• Primary care 
practices do not 
have time and 
resources to do 
ECGs. 
• Primary care 
doctors might 
lack the skills to 





The telehealth project for OSA 
OSA is a disorder that causes a temporary cessation of breathing (apnoea) or 
severely reduced air flow (hypopnoea) at sleep. When this happens, the 
patient wakes up and breathes normally for a while before the cycle starts 
again. OSA is usually diagnosed by a referral for a sleep study requiring an 
overnight stay in a hospital (CCG, 2014). The CCG aimed to reduce the costs 
associated with diagnosis and treatment of OSA at the hospital by 
commissioning a community-based home diagnosis and telemonitoring 
service from an existing provider that specializes in sleep disorders.  
There was consensus among clinical managers that the adoption of 
telehealth for the diagnosis and treatment of OSA had several advantages: it 
met clinical needs by improving OSA diagnosis rate, it could bring care closer 
to home and, therefore, improve patients’ experience, and could deliver 
financial returns by shifting the diagnosis and care of OSA patients from 
secondary care to the community. In this respect, the telehealth project 
embodied and reconciled three health service logics: the medical professional 
logic of delivering a clinically sound and effective intervention, the PCC logic 
of bringing care closer to home, and the managerialist logic of cutting costs.  
As for most healthcare services, the support of primary care doctors was 
crucial for the success of the new service. Indeed, they had to be made aware 
of the condition, be able to recognize the symptoms of OSA, and refer the 
patient to the OSA clinic. For this reason, the new telehealth service could 
increase primary care doctors’ knowledge of the condition and enrich their 
professional practice. Claire, the Clinical Lead for Public Health involved in the 
OSA project, summarised the core benefits of the new service as follows: 
“[The OSA telehealth service] will increase [primary care doctors’] general 
knowledge about sleep apnoea, will increase the provision of sleep studies [for 
the diagnosis of sleep apnoea] and it’s more convenient for patients, […] they 
don’t have to stay overnight in hospital. Given that you’re avoiding all these 
hospital admissions, then it’s quite cost effective as well”. 
According to Frank, one of the Ear, Nose and Throat (ENT) consultants 
that worked for the OSA service provider, Claire was a key advocate of the 
new telehealth service and, in her position as both clinician and Clinical Lead 
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for Public Health, played a crucial role in convincing the commissioners of its 
value: 
“The reason it worked here is that we […] had an individual within the CCG 
who was a public health doctor who understood […] the clinical benefits and, 
therefore, […] presented  [our idea to the commissioners] – […] she was our 
advocate”. 
Claire sat in the working group that approved the OSA telehealth 
service. The service received the final go-ahead from the Clinical Advisory 
Board and was then implemented. Jack, one of the Clinical Commissioners, 
said that the Board’s reaction to the new service was positive since it could 
save money without compromising clinical care. He added that the new 
telehealth service did not encroach with the primary care doctors’ routines and 
responsibilities and, therefore, it did not challenge the medical practice and 
professionalism of primary care doctors: 
“We are not changing the treatment of OSA, so if we suspect someone of having 
this condition, we are still going to refer them somewhere because it’s not a 
condition that [we as doctors] can manage in primary care, so the only thing 
that this is changing is where we refer them to”. 
Jack was also present in one of the clinical network meetings with other 
clinical colleagues who, he said, did not object to the new service since it was 
going to be “cheaper” and “better for the patient”. Jocelyn, a Clinical 
Commissioner, explained the role of clinical networks as follows: 
“[Clinical networks] don’t make decisions […]. They get information back from 
GPs about their patients and what we should commission… So [clinical 
networks] are supposed to be the teeth of clinical commissioning, to really 
bring things to the patient”.  
Through clinical networks and their role of clinical commissioners, 
doctors were representing medical professionalism by giving voice to the 
views of their clinical colleagues. In this regard, Jack, one of the Clinical 
Commissioners, defined the CCG as a “membership organisation”, that is, an 
organisation whose membership included all primary care doctors in their 
locality. In explaining his role as Clinical Commissioner, he added: 
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“I also represent the views of the other [primary care doctors]… So we all have 
our membership meetings, all the [primary care doctors] go there, we talk 
about all these different issues and then I bring those views back to the CCG”. 
We view this function of representation as an expression of the 
professional collegiality that unites primary care doctors as members of the 
same profession under common values, customs, and norms (McDonald et 
al., 2009). One of the implications of professional collegiality was that clinical 
managers were concerned that all primary care doctors in the community had 
the opportunity to feed their views about the telehealth project. For example, 
in an interview, Stewart, the Clinical Lead for Integrated Care, said that 
evidence of poor communication and consultation with other clinical 
colleagues blocked previous initiatives approved by the CCG. 
To conclude, our findings suggest that the Clinical Commissioners 
successfully approved the OSA telehealth service for two main reasons. First, 
there was a clinical manager (or hybrid) (i.e. Claire, the Clinical Lead for 
Public Health), who was also an innovation advocate, namely, she was willing 
and able to act as the advocate for IT innovation and convince clinical 
commissioners of its value. Second, the new telehealth service did not 
present particular challenges since, by moving the diagnosis and treatment of 
OSA out of hospitals into the community, it was not going to disrupt medical 
professionals’ practice. Therefore, the logics of PCC and managerialism that it 
embodied were not in conflict with the logic of medical professionalism and 
did not stand in the way of clinical managers’ role of representation of their 
clinical colleagues. In addition, primary care doctors could take advantage 
professionally from the new service by learning more about the OSA 
condition. In this sense, the OSA telehealth service could be seen as 
benefitting medical professionalism.    
The telehealth project for HF 
The re-design of the cardiology service envisaged the use of telehealth for the 
community-based monitoring and assistance of HF patients. Most cardiology 
patients were sent to outpatient clinics at hospitals because community 
services lacked the necessary equipment and staff to look after them. So 
cardiology patients were monitored and treated in the acute sector. As a 
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result, the pressure to reduce hospital admissions and cut healthcare costs 
was high. In an interview Ed, the Project Manager in charge of telehealth, 
explained they planned to use the existing telecare team to monitor data 
received from the equipment installed in the patient’s home. Once all false 
alarms, fault equipment issues, etc. had been cleared, data would be sent to a 
community nurse to provide appropriate clinical response to alerts.  
The telehealth service for HF embodied both logics of managerialism 
and PCC since it matched the financial need of cutting costs with the clinical 
need of improving patients’ outcomes by moving care closer to home. For 
example, asked about the opportunities that telehealth would offer for her 
profession as a primary care doctor and her role as a Clinical Commissioner, 
Jocelyn replied:  
“So, as a [primary care doctor], telehealth might potentially keep people out of 
hospital, it might mean people consult with me less. It might mean better health 
for the patients, it might mean [patients] feel more empowered about managing 
their own conditions. As a commissioner, it might reduce people going into 
hospital, which will ultimately save money”. 
One of the apparent challenges of this particular telehealth project was 
the tension between the logics of PCC and medical professionalism that it 
could potentially create. More specifically, Peter, the Clinical Lead for 
Cardiology, was vocal about the negative impact that telehealth could have on 
the workload of primary care doctors by moving care out of hospital into 
primary and community care:  
“I’m being given the hardware but with no system or pathway for it to feed into.  
[…] I’ve been trying to speak with [Ed, the Project Manager] saying, “How 
does that infrastructure work?”… Does it give clinicians more work? Does it 
make patients more anxious?” 
Sue, the Public Health Lead for the Local Authority, attended the 
cardiology working group, which discussed the need for a competent, trained 
healthcare professional (e.g. a specialist nurse) who was going to pick up 
alerts triggered by the telehealth system. According to Sue, the working group 
echoed Peter’s concerns about the safety of the patient and that the lack of 
someone that was sufficiently prepared and competent to do the monitoring 
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would cause more calls to primary care doctors’ practices and increase their 
workload. As far as clinical safety was a concern, Sue said: 
“[Primary care doctors] do things with clinical safety in mind […] so they 
would want more clarity on how [telehealth] would fit into the way they already 
deliver”. 
Given the uncertainty around safety and workload issues, the working 
group for cardiology did not approve the telehealth project and asked Ed, the 
Project Manager, to report back with more evidence about how the telehealth 
service could be delivered without compromising clinical care. Janet, the 
Business Consultant of the provider in charge of the telehealth equipment, 
suggested that doctors’ requests for more evidence usually conceal their 
concerns about the impact of telehealth on their workload:  
“[Primary care doctors] are always saying that there’s not enough evidence. I 
don’t think that that’s even the kind of the hurdle around it because there’s lots 
of evidence [that telehealth works], but they are genuinely concerned about 
their workload […] they want to make sure that it’s not asking them to do one 
more thing”. 
Therefore, we interpret the request for more evidence as a way through 
which clinical managers sought to protect the integrity of their medical 
practice. Thus, instead of acting as mediators between conflicting logics, 
clinical managers acted as buffers between telehealth and clinical colleagues 
in order to protect medical professionalism. For example, Jocelyn, one of the 
Clinical Commissioners, said that they were not expecting much involvement 
in the telehealth project from primary care doctors until they had more 
evidence about its benefits: 
“At the moment [the telehealth project] probably has to be driven by us as the 
CCG and then we have to think about what commitment […] and buy-in we 
need from other colleagues”. 
Phil, Clinical Commissioner and Chair of the CCG, suggested that 
doctors are not “creative people” and can therefore easily “tear apart” an 
innovation if they are not fully convinced of its value: 
“If you give doctors the opportunity they will have shredded [an innovation], 
they will interrogate and tear it apart and look for all the faults, because they’re 
not naturally creative people, so they look for flaws”. 
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Thus, the need for evidence is a “delaying tactic” not only to protect 
medical professionalism from telehealth, but also to protect telehealth from 
medical professionalism itself. For this reason, clinical managers identified 
themselves as medical professionals, which required them to place the clinical 
impact of telehealth under tight scrutiny as, Phil, Clinical Commissioner and 
Chair of the CCG, suggested in this interview: 
“[An innovation] has to go through a number of test questions, the cynical 
older questions: ‘Why is that better than what we’re using now? Is it as safe?’ 
[…]. So our role is [to ensure] safety, scrutiny, reliability, confidentiality, all 
the things that [make us (doctors)] known as conservative”. 
Clinical commissioners’ identification as being conservative like all the 
other doctors shows their strong sense of professional collegiality and 
identification with their peers. This directed the scrutiny of the adoption of 
telehealth towards what they felt were the expectations of their clinical 
colleagues. One of the downsides of this approach was clinical 
commissioners’ apparent behaviour as innovation laggards who lack initiative, 
creativity, and authority to innovate as Peter, the Clinical Lead for Cardiology, 
explained in this quote:  
“The trouble with the CCG is often they – […] they don’t look outside of the 
box.  […] – I don’t feel as though [the CCG] has always moved on quickly and 
[…] you [as clinical lead] have not been given a mandate to […] get on and 
change things”. 
To summarize, unlike the OSA telehealth service, the telehealth project 
for HF did not move forward for the following reasons. First, in spite of 
reconciling managerialism with PCC, its logic of PCC was at odds with the 
integrity of doctors’ medical practice. Second, clinical managers did not use 
their hybrid role to mediate between these contradictory logics, but they acted 
as buffers to protect medical professionalism from telehealth. In addition, they 
strongly identified themselves with their professional college (or clinical 
colleagues) to the extent that they evaluated telehealth based on the same 





Recommendations for the use of ECGs in primary care 
The cardiology working group made recommendations that GPs should do 
more cardiology tests in their clinics before sending patients to hospitals. Sue, 
the Public Health Lead for the Local Authority and member of the cardiology 
working group, recalled that these recommendations originated from a review 
of their cardiology pathway:  
“All the different pathways flow from GP to outpatient clinics, and then to 
secondary care; […] we analysed activities, how much has been spent, […] and 
from there we just made some recommendations suggesting that GPs should do 
more tests in their clinic, before sending patients out. […] So […] we just made 
recommendations on how [GPs] could manage their patients better before 
entering into secondary care”. 
The managerialist logic of saving costs was a key driver of these 
recommendations given that the CCG could save money by shifting basic 
cardiac outpatient services from hospitals to primary care. ECGs were among 
the cardiology tests that GPs were required to perform in their practices. Yet, 
in spite of the CCG’s recommendations, some GPs decided not to do ECGs 
because they did not want to increase their already heavy workload. 
Comparing the experience with ECGs with the possibility of adopting 
telehealth in the future, Sue, the Public Health Lead, said: 
“We did recommend […] doing ECGs in [primary care…], but some doctors 
said they […] did not have the time to do it. So, if they’re not having time to 
even do ECGs, how would patients […] on telehealth […] impact their 
workload?” 
In contrast with telehealth, Peter, the clinical lead for cardiology did not 
echo primary care doctors’ concerns about the inability to carry out ECGs 
because of excessive workload. Instead, he sought to convince his clinical 
colleagues of the cost-savings of doing ECGs within primary care:  
“Why are some of my [clinical] colleagues referring for an ECG to [secondary 
care] when they charge us £50 to do that and yet the machine costs […] a 
thousand pounds? […] So that’s my job, to say, “Right why are we spending all 
this money on this? I – clinicians, coming in and speaking with [Commissioning 




In this example, Peter took on the role of innovation broker between the 
management decision in support of an IT innovation and medical 
professionals, by providing a managerialist argument in favour of ECGs in 
primary care. Specifically, he leveraged his hybrid role to adopt principles of 
managerialism and transform medical practice, thereby reconciling 
managerialism with medical professionalism. Both clinical commissioners and 
clinical leads identified themselves in this role, which involved providing 
clinical guidance and advice to translate managerial ideas and plans into 
medical practice. For example, Jack, a Clinical Commissioner, said: 
“[…] it may be that [commissioning managers] have a great idea, they start 
running with it, but then they encounter a problem two years down the line 
because in real terms it doesn’t work.  So […] my job […] is to [say…] ‘Will it 
work in reality?’, or if not ‘what might you change to make it work?’” 
The role of clinical managers in reconciling managerialism with medical 
professionalism was important because it could gain the support of primary 
care doctors to IT innovation. For example, Stewart, a primary care doctor 
and Clinical Lead for Integrated Care working closely with commissioners for 
the re-design of the cardiology pathway, suggested that a key role for 
commissioners was to twist the managerialist argument in favour of primary 
care. In other words, they should convince primary care doctors of the 
opportunities of reinvesting the money saved from hospital admissions into 
primary care: 
“[Primary care doctors] […] need to understand the benefits of preventing 
hospital admissions so that there is actually capacity to take money out of 
secondary care to invest in primary care and community services. They need to 
see that ultimately there is a win in it for them.”  
Peter, the Clinical Lead for Cardiology, also added – “as doctors we are 
very much evidence-based” – and that they followed NICE’s (National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence) clinical guidelines when making recommendations for 
changes in their clinical pathways, such as introducing ECGs in primary care1.  
 
1 For example, one of NICE’s clinical guidelines on Atrial Fibrillation published in 2014 was to 
“Perform an electrocardiogram (ECG) in all people, whether symptomatic or not, in whom 
atrial fibrillation is suspected because an irregular pulse has been detected”. It is then the 
responsibility of clinical commissioners to establish how this guideline can be implemented 
(National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2014).  
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“Commissioners are […] very good with money, but […] a lot of them wouldn’t 
know what an ECG was and whether it could be done in a GP environment 
[…]. Do I make a decision on how [patients] are treated? No, we go via local 
guidelines and national guidelines. […] If NICE recommends that X, Y and Z is 
done, we try and make sure that that pathway is present”. 
In their clinical guidelines for Atrial Fibrillation, for example, NICE stated 
that their recommendations follow “careful consideration of the evidence 
available” (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2014). In other 
words, their guidance is evidence-led. This gives doctors reassurance about 
the clinical safety and cost-effectiveness of their recommendations. 
To conclude, the managerialist logic of saving costs drove 
recommendations for adopting ECGs in primary care. This logic created 
tensions with the medical practice of GPs, who were concerned about the 
workload implications of carrying out ECGs in their practice. As opposed to 
the case of telehealth for HF, clinical managers used their hybrid role to 
mediate between managerialism and medical professionals’ concerns about 
the integrity of their medical practice. Unlike telehealth, there were clear 
clinical guidelines that informed clinical commissioners’ recommendations for 
the use of ECGs in primary care. 
The institutional impact of IT and clinical managers’ role in IT innovation  
In the case study, we analysed three types of IT innovation: the telehealth 
service for OSA and, as part of the re-design of the local cardiology service, 
the telehealth service for HF and the use of ECGs in primary care. As 
summarised in Table 4, each of these different types of IT innovation had 
different effects on the relationship among multiple institutional logics, which is 
reflected in clinical managers’ (or hybrids’) role as innovators. Next, we 
discuss these different roles and draw on the re-stratification thesis (Freidson, 









Institutional impact of IT innovation  Hybrids’ role as innovators 
Telehealth for OSA: reconciles 
managerialism, PCC logic, and medical 
professionalism. 
• Innovation advocate: acts as 
advocate of IT innovation. 
Telehealth for HF: reconciles 
managerialism with PCC, but PCC 
logic creates tension with medical 
professionalism. 
• Innovation laggard: acts as buffer 
between IT innovation and 
medical practice and evaluates IT 
innovation based on medical 
professional principles (e.g. 
clinical safety). 
ECG: embeds managerialist logic of 
cost-saving. This creates tension with 
medical professionalism.  
• Innovation broker: mediates 
between managerialism and 
medical professionalism to 
transform medical practice and 
convince doctors of the benefits of 
IT innovation.  
Table 4. Clinical managers’ use of their hybrid role in IT innovation 
 
The telehealth project for OSA reconciled the managerialist and PCC 
logics and, most of all, did not challenge the logic of medical professionalism. 
On the contrary, clinical managers, namely, the administrative elite, felt that 
the new service could enrich the medical practice of primary care doctors (or 
rank and file) by increasing their knowledge of OSA. For these reasons, this 
project did not involve any particular conflict between clinical managers’ role 
as hybrids and their medical professional identities. In this occasion, Claire, 
the Clinical Lead for Public Health, was fully supportive of the telehealth 
project and behaved as innovation advocate, i.e. someone that is willing and 
capable of being the advocate for telehealth and convince other clinical 
managers of its value. 
By contrast, the conflict between clinical managers’ hybrid role and their 
identity as medical professionals became evident when they perceived the 
PCC logic of the telehealth project for HF as disrupting medical practice and, 
therefore, as being at odds with medical professionalism. Despite reconciling 
managerialism with PCC, the telehealth project for HF was less successful in 
mediating between the PCC logic and medical professionalism. This explains 
the dominance of medical professionalism in influencing clinical managers’ 
reaction to the HF project. Instead of activating their role as mediators 
between opposite logics, which represented clinical managers’ identification 
(Lok, 2010) with their hybrids’ role, clinical managers clung on to their sense 
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of professional collegiality, thereby, acting as representatives of medical 
professionalism. As a consequence, their identity as medical professionals 
had a strong influence on how they evaluated the telehealth project for HF. By 
drawing on principles of medical professionalism, such as safety, which had 
important implications for lines of responsibility and the workload of primary 
care doctors, clinical managers acted as innovation laggards. Even though 
concerns about safety and workload were genuine and legitimate, we 
consider the role of innovation laggards to be passive, in that it did not attempt 
to reconcile differences between the logics of telehealth and medical 
professionalism but just took such differences for granted. In particular, in 
contrast with the clinical lead for OSA, by playing this passive role towards 
innovation, the clinical lead for cardiology delayed the implementation of 
telehealth and acted mostly as a representative of the safety and workload 
concerns of his clinical colleagues, i.e. other primary care doctors. 
The fact that the clinical lead for cardiology was sceptical about 
telehealth does not mean that he was averse to innovation. On the contrary, 
in an effort to mediate between managerialism and medical professionalism 
and transform medical practice, he performed the role of innovation broker to 
convince his clinical colleagues of the cost-saving benefits of integrating ECG 
into primary care, regardless of their concerns about excessive workload. This 
example shows that clinical managers were not passive individuals, but they 
could negotiate their social position (Battilana, 2011) as administrative elite 
(Freidson, 1994; McDonald et al., 2009) to reconcile the logics of IT 
innovation with medical professionalism. Not only could they shape IT 
innovation, but they were also aware of the power of IT innovation to shape 
their profession. 
One possible explanation for the clinical lead’s different approach to IT 
innovation is that recommendations for the use of ECGs into primary care 
benefitted from some sort of legitimacy within medical professionalism that 
telehealth for HF did not have. More specifically, the clinical lead and 
members of the cardiology working group made such recommendations in 
line with NICE guidelines. These guidelines were evidence-led and were thus 
a source of legitimacy for the adoption of ECG in primary care. Drawing on 
the re-stratification thesis (Freidson, 1994), NICE corresponds to the 
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knowledge elite of medical professionalism, which develops new standards for 
medical practice that the administrative elite, in this case the clinical lead for 
cardiology, has to enforce on rank and file (i.e. primary care doctors). 
Telehealth started mainly as a PCC initiative to integrate health and social 
care within the community and, in line with managerialism, save money on 
hospital admissions and consultations. Therefore, it lacked the legitimacy from 
the knowledge elite, i.e. a body of professionals that could guarantee about its 
safety and clinical effectiveness. This might explain why the clinical lead for 
cardiology neutralised his hybrid role and acted as innovation laggard by 
requesting more evidence about the impact of telehealth on medical practice.  
DISCUSSION 
Professional hybrids’ role in managing competing institutional logics in 
IT innovation 
Clinical managers occupy a key position for the success of IT innovation. Not 
only can they leverage their organisational status to promote the adoption of 
IT innovation, but they can also use their hybrid role as managerial 
professionals to negotiate tensions and contradictions across professional 
boundaries and logics. Even though research has recognised differences in 
the way hybrids might use their role to manage conflicting logics and influence 
change (McGivern et al., 2015), the way hybrids use their role to facilitate IT 
innovation has not been fully explored. In addressing this gap, our study 
answers the following research question: how do clinical managers reconcile 
differences among competing institutional logics that affect IT innovation in 
healthcare? In response to our research question, our study found that how 
clinical managers perceived their hybrid identity and the adoption of IT 
innovation in relation to their profession influenced their role as “innovators” in 
mediating among competing logics. Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical 
contribution of our findings and, more specifically, the role of hybrids in the 






Figure 1. The role of hybrids in managing competing institutional logics in IT 
innovation 
 
On the horizontal axis we show the degree of conflict between 
institutional logics. On the vertical axis we show the roles that clinical 
managers or hybrids can assume in dealing with different degrees of conflict 
between logics. Based on the three examples of IT innovation in the case 
study (telehealth for OSA, telehealth for HF, and ECGs), we identified three 
degrees of conflict between logics (no conflict – moderate – and high) and 
three roles in IT innovation (innovation advocate, innovation broker, 
innovation laggard), respectively. 
First, the project of telehealth for OSA showed that a clinical manager is 
more likely to act as an innovation advocate in a situation where an IT 
innovation reconciles multiple logics (e.g. PCC, managerialism, and medical 
professionalism) and, consequently, does not involve a conflict with either the 
hybrid identity of clinical managers (or administrative elite) or the medical 
professional principles of clinical care held by primary care doctors (or rank 
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to the emergence of a hybrid logic, but one that is more contingent upon his or 
her competency and the context in which he or she operates. 
Second, the example of ECGs suggests that the cost-saving logic of 
managerialism that drives an IT innovation can lead to moderate conflict with 
medical practice when it promotes practices in line with recommendations 
from a knowledge elite (e.g. NICE). Since these recommendations reflect 
common principles of medical professionalism (e.g. evidence-based 
medicine), clinical managers are more likely to use their hybrid role and act as 
innovation brokers. In this role, they draw on managerialism to execute the 
recommendations of the knowledge elite and support the adoption of an IT 
innovation to transform the medical practice of rank and file. 
Finally, the example of the telehealth project for HF showed that clinical 
managers may perceive a higher conflict between the PCC logic of an IT 
innovation when this contradicts the medical professional principles of clinical 
care (e.g. safety) and, at the same time, lacks the legitimacy of a knowledge 
elite. In addition, even though PCC can accommodate elements of 
managerialism (e.g. by promoting cost savings), its emergent nature and the 
fact that it has little in common with clinical managers’ hybrid identity makes 
clinical managers’ task of reconciling it with medical professionalism even 
harder. Our findings suggest that, under these circumstances, clinical 
managers are more likely to act as representatives of the medical professional 
logic. By doing so, they perform as innovation laggards who act as buffers 
between IT innovation and their clinical colleagues (the rank and file) by 
evaluating IT innovation according to the principles of medical 
professionalism. 
Therefore, for clinical managers (namely, the administrative elite) to act 
as innovators that facilitate IT innovation across multiple logics, the IT 
innovation has to be presented in a way that acknowledges the concerns of 
medical practitioners (i.e. rank and file). If IT innovation is represented as 
breaching the boundaries of what is considered legitimate within medical 
professionalism (normally represented by the knowledge elite), clinical 
managers are less likely to leverage the social position of their hybrid role to 
persuade medical practitioners of the value of IT innovation. 
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Professional governance and IT innovation  
According to Freidson (1985), professional elites are more detached from and 
directive of everyday professional work to the extent that they break norms of 
professional solidarity and collegiality. By contrast, in line with other studies 
(McDonald et al., 2009), clinical commissioners’ identification of the CCG as a 
“membership organisation” demonstrates that professional collegiality is 
important for the exercise of elites’ authority. In particular, our study suggests 
that those clinical managers that lack a cohesive hybrid identity (Spyridonidis 
et al., 2015), due to a strong sense of professional collegiality, find it more 
difficult to be pro-active innovators and enact a coherent and decisive 
response to the conflicting institutional demands of IT innovation.  
The strength of professional collegiality across the hierarchy of the 
medical profession (i.e. rank and file, administrative elite, and knowledge elite) 
represents the persistence of medical professionalism and the ability of 
medical professionals to readapt to external changes and accommodate 
managerialism (Exworthy et al., 2019). In the case study, clinical managers 
demonstrated confidence in bridging between the managerialist and medical 
professional logics in support of an IT innovation (see the example of ECGs). 
Therefore, doctors can deflect managerial challenges, fending off 
managerialism. Yet, PCC is a different sort of challenge as it is directed to the 
apparent core purpose of the profession – the patient. The shift of some 
hospital services into the community under the PCC logic requires different 
healthcare professions to work together. This might increase a sense of 
vulnerability and loss of control in medical professionals, who need a greater 
sense of trust in other professions (e.g. nurses or social workers). Under 
these circumstances, clinical managers might perceive higher conflict 
between the PCC logic and their professional identity and, therefore, be less 
willing to leverage their social position to facilitate IT innovation (see example 
of telehealth for HF). Therefore, the role of IT innovations in reducing conflict 
between logics is crucial in reducing medical professionals’ sense of 
vulnerability and the dominance of medical professionalism with respect to 
other logics. This may also result in greater clinical managers’ commitment to 
IT innovation (see example of telehealth for OSA). 
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Medical professionals’ sense of vulnerability in relation to an IT 
innovation and the institutional logic that it represents leads us to our next 
point, that is, the importance of standardised professional guidelines that 
administrative elites use to evaluate the effectiveness of an IT innovation and 
govern their professional colleagues (or rank and file) (Ferlie et al., 2012). An 
example is guidelines of clinical safety established by knowledge elites (e.g. 
NICE) as a complex form of discipline and “self-surveillance” (Waring, 2014) 
and used by clinical managers to evaluate an IT innovation. The interpretation 
of evidence is both contextual and contested (Fitzgerald et al., 2003) due to 
the role of institutional logics in filtering actors’ perceptions about the risk and 
effectiveness of IT investments (Mola & Carugati, 2012). The case study 
showed that from the point of view of a medical professional, the apparent 
lack of evidence of clinical effectiveness and, most of all, clinical safety is 
strongly related to workload concerns and the integrity of medical practice. 
Therefore, there is a strong connection between evidence about the clinical 
effectiveness of a new IT innovation and the subjectivity of medical 
professionals (Ferlie et al., 2012). The perceived lack of such evidence might 
increase doctors’ sense of vulnerability to IT innovation and reduce clinical 
managers’ willingness to mediate between medical professionalism and the 
competing logics that an IT innovation embodies. 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Our first contribution is to provide an increased understanding of the role of 
“clinical leaders” in facilitating IT innovation, which remains overlooked in 
current research (Davidson & Chismar, 2007; Oborn et al., 2011; Rivard et al., 
2011). The clinician dimension has specific connotations given the traditional 
resistance of doctors to external reform to their sense of autonomy, and to the 
traditional doctor-patient encounter (Exworthy et al., 2003). By drawing on 
recent work on the sociology of (clinical) professions (McDonald, 2017; 
McDonald et al., 2009; McGivern et al., 2015; Spyridonidis et al., 2015), our 
research unveils how clinical managers’ perception of their hybrid role in 
relation to their profession influences how they respond to the conflicting 
institutional demands that challenge IT innovation in healthcare (Boonstra et 
al., 2008; Bunduchi et al., 2015; Pouloudi et al., 2016; Rivard et al., 2011). We 
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contend that clinical managers that are entrusted by their clinical colleagues 
to fill in a managerial role are more wary of the consequences that IT 
innovation may have on their profession. 
Beyond healthcare, our second contribution concerns the role of 
professions and different occupational groups in facilitating digital 
transformation at the intersection of multiple institutional logics. We posit that 
the role of hybrids is not unique to clinical managers but operates in non-
healthcare contexts of digital transformation too. Recent research suggests 
that success of IT innovations depends on users’ continuous effort of 
compromising between the professional norms that guide their action and 
norms of standardisation and efficiency embedded in IT innovations (Berente 
& Yoo, 2012).  
Other studies imply that some logics (e.g. IT professionalism vs. 
managerialism) are easier to reconcile than others (e.g. IT professionalism vs. 
medical professionalism) (Boonstra et al., 2017). We add to this body of 
research by showing how different types of IT innovations can influence the 
extent to which different institutional logics are either complementary or 
competing. In addition, we demonstrate the crucial role of professional-
managerial hybrids (Waring, 2014) in polarising or bridging between logics 
that affect IT innovation (Boonstra et al., 2017) and in determining the 
strategies of association with and disassociation from IT innovations that 
threaten the autonomy of professional practice (Jensen et al., 2009). More 
specifically, in our case study, we identified three degrees of conflict between 
institutional logics: “no conflict”, “moderate conflict”, and “high conflict”. Each 
of these degrees of conflict corresponded to a specific hybrids’ role in IT 
innovation, namely, innovation advocate, innovation broker, and innovation 
laggard, respectively.  
By drawing on the re-stratification thesis (Freidson, 1985), we were able 
to analyse to what extent clinical managers (or administrative elites) were 
willing to enrol clinical colleagues (or rank and file) to support an IT 
innovation. In particular, we further demonstrate that the potential of hybrid 
identities in compromising between multiple logics is hard to realise in the 
case of professions whose hierarchical and self-governing structures are 
grounded in deep-seated professional guidelines and a broader sense of 
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professional autonomy. For example, in our case study clinical managers (or 
administrative elites) had to consider professional guidelines from knowledge 
elites and concerns about the integrity of clinical practice from rank and files 
before making IT-related decisions. Therefore, whereas recent research 
points to the need for organisations to include professional values and 
cultures in support of digital transformation (Tumbas et al., 2018), the internal 
structures through which certain professions regulate their own work makes 
this task more difficult and can raise barriers to the boundary spanning 
function of IT systems across occupational groups (Mola & Carugati, 2012).  
Finally, our work has implications for practice. In particular, it shows that 
by mediating between conflicting logics, clinical managers can act as 
innovation brokers between management decisions of adopting IT innovation 
and medical professionals. In this way, they can more effectively facilitate the 
adoption of an IT innovation in medical practice. By contrast, clinical 
managers can undermine the success of an IT innovation by acting 
exclusively as representatives of medical professionalism. Our case study 
suggests that clinical managers need to work more closely with IT 
professionals and other professional groups in finding ways of integrating IT 
innovations that have proven clinical and efficiency benefits into their 
professional practice. 
Even though our case study raises implications for understanding IT 
innovation in various professional contexts, its findings are not without 
limitations and need to be understood in relation to the context of primary care 
and the recent establishment of CCGs for the commissioning of healthcare 
services in England. In the current situation of underfunding and the 
increasing demands of an aging population, primary care doctors are 
understandably wary of IT innovations that might require their additional time 
and effort. In addition, at the time of this research, the CCG that we studied 
had been in place for no more than three years. This means that the clinical 
commissioners that we interviewed were still at the beginning of their career 
as clinical managers and their organisations were still novel. Future research 
could take a longitudinal approach to investigate how conflict in logics might 
shift over time and how clinical managers’ and other managerial 
professionals’ roles as innovators might change as IT innovation unfolds. 
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Further studies could also research how professionals’ motivation for taking 
on a managerial position (McGivern et al., 2015) might influence their role in 
facilitating IT innovation.  
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